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The Emerging Storm: 
Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish 
Rapprochement, 1934-1935
Otto Kienitz
 In January 1934, a gentleman from northern England 
traced the historic route of  St. Paul the Apostle, only this time 
in the opposite direction—straight into the blinding rays of  the 
rising sun. The man travelled east aboard the Oriental Express, 
steaming from Vienna to Istanbul, and then onward across the 
Anatolian Plateau, which was flecked white by an early winter 
snow. He was bound for the new Turkish capital of  Ankara 
in central Anatolia. The man arrived at his destination on the 
morning of  January 30, 1934, greeted by a damp chill that settled 
between the alleyways on the steep slopes of  the old town.1 This 
man was Sir Percy Loraine of  Kirkharle, a fifty-four year old 
British ambassador who had ended his post in Egypt a year be-
fore and now was slated to take charge of  the British Embassy in 
Turkey. Still bitter from being assigned to the “wilds of  Anato-
lia,” he was in a sour mood when his compatriots met him at the 
railway station.2
 Ambassador Loraine ascended quickly through the ranks 
of  the British Foreign Service, building his diplomatic acumen 
as a young attaché at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and 
then as a more experienced diplomat, moving from Spain, Per-
sia, Greece, and Egypt, before packing his bags for Turkey. He 
won fame as an “Orientalist” for his cordial rapport with eastern 
strongmen like Reza Khan of  Iran (with whom he negotiated in 
Tehran as Head of  Mission in the mid-1920s). Loraine noted his 
affinity for working with certain despotic personalities in his dia-
ry: “I do understand them better than most people—and I know, 
too, that their affection once won, is a very charming thing.”3 A 
note from Loraine’s wife and the executors of  the diplomat’s 
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will contained the following posthumous praise for the British 
Ambassador from historian Sir Pierson Dixon: “[H]is conduct 
of  affairs was based on his belief  that it is ‘men’ that count—not 
machines—in the order of  human affairs; his achievements, his 
trials which were those of  his country, and how he set about 
overcoming them being the evidence as to the truth of  his be-
liefs.”4
 During his tenure in Ankara between 1934-1939, Am-
bassador Sir Percy Loraine was responsible for organizing a 
geopolitical rapprochement between Britain and the Republic 
of  Turkey. This historical study weaves the tale of  Sir Percy Lo-
raine’s personal diplomacy through the overarching narrative of  
European international relations. It prioritizes Britain’s imperial 
and geopolitical interests in the security of  the Mediterranean 
Basin as well as the territorial sovereignty of  the nascent Turk-
ish Republic. The mid-1930s were characterized by an anxious 
response on the part of  the status quo powers threatened by 
the fascist revisionism sprouting in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and 
Sir Percy Loraine, GCMG PC (November 5, 1880 – May 23, 1961)
Educated at Eton College and then later at New College, Oxford, Loraine 
served in the British Foreign Office for almost four decades, from 1904-1941.
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Adolf  Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Upon the backdrop of  interwar 
diplomatic history, this essay details Ambassador Loraine’s ex-
perience forming his first strong relationship with the Turkish 
government in 1934, the challenges he confronted while work-
ing between London and Ankara during the early years of  An-
glo-Turkish rapprochement, and the impact of  the burgeoning 
Anglo-Turkish relationship on the brewing storm of  European 
diplomatic history during 1935 and beyond.
THE BALKAN PACT AND THE ITALIAN MENACE
 The signing of  the defensive Balkan Pact between 
Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on February 9, 1934, 
was the first alarm to the British signaling the change in geo-
politics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The coordination of  the 
Balkan Pact was a reaction to Italian Prime Minister Benito Mus-
solini’s exclusive Four Power Pact, proposed in 1933, in which 
Italy called for great power cooperation between Berlin, London, 
Paris, and Rome. The Balkan Pact was therefore designed as a 
regional counterweight to Great Power politics that kept the “de-
mands and interests of  the smaller states” in mind.5 Turkey took 
the lead in Balkan diplomacy to orchestrate a defensive “‘neutral-
ity’ bloc” against the carving of  the peninsula into spheres of  ex-
ternal influence.6 Because Ankara still remained at odds with the 
four Great Powers over a number of  territorial disputes, Turkish 
policy was “generally perceived as promoting the interests of  
the regional countries and diluting great power control in the 
Balkans,” as well as deterring a provocative Bulgarian collusion 
with Fascist Italy that could threaten the stability of  the Eastern 
Mediterranean.7 The multilateral agreement offered Turkey the 
support it desired to warn Bulgaria against pursuing revanchist 
policies in the Balkan Peninsula, buying time for Ankara to “or-
ganize a regional defense against Italy”—the larger and more 
menacing threat to the stability of  the Mediterranean Basin.8
 Ever since the conclusion of  the Mosul Crisis in 1926, 
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British attention and materiel in the region had been quietly 
dwindling.9 Suddenly the Balkan Pact, and the lacuna of  Bul-
garia’s exclusion from the defensive club, brought the question 
of  Turkish security (and thus the remilitarization of  the Turkish 
Straits) to the fore.10 As Ambassador Loraine noted in a tele-
graph dated May 6, 1934, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras had reasoned, “If  nations rearmed, 
Turkey was entitled to behave as they. She would not accept dif-
ferent treatment.”11 Since Bulgaria was determined to rearm its 
military, Dr. Aras implied that the whole trend toward rearma-
ment required Turkey to revisit the status of  the demilitarized 
Turkish Straits. British Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs Sir 
John Simon, however, retorted that this would make “a most 
unpleasant impression.”12
 The French and Italian Ambassadors to Turkey were 
similarly alarmed, and urged the Great Powers to stand together 
against Turkish revisionism. As aforementioned, the Turks were 
concerned primarily with the collusion between Italy and Bul-
garia. Mussolini’s government was providing arms to the Bul-
garians, and the Turkish government interpreted this develop-
ment as a direct threat to the demilitarized zone in the region of  
Thrace along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The resident drago-
man James Morgan reported on the deliberations of  the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly of  June 1934.13 He described Turkish 
Interior Minister Sükrü Kaya’s speech in response to the threats 
posed against Turkey from the Mediterranean:
In the light of  events which have recently created a stir in 
Turkey, such as the speeches of  Signor Mussolini about 
possible Italian expansion in the East; increase of  Ital-
ian strength in the Dodecanese [Islands], and suspected 
Italian aid to Bulgaria, it is natural to connect the sudden 
decision to increase the credits for national defense with 
Turkey’s distrust and dislike of  Italy.14
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In front of  the Turkish Parliament, Kaya, simultaneously acting 
as Minister for Foreign Affairs while Dr. Aras was away tending 
to affairs at the League of  Nations in Geneva, referenced Musso-
lini’s speech from March 18 in which the Italian Premier extolled, 
“Expansion in Africa and Asia is the task for future generations 
of  Italians.”15 The Turkish public was unnerved by the rhetoric 
of  the fascist government in Italy and, as Ambassador Loraine 
wrote in his first Annual Report on Turkey, “It seems probable 
that Turkish Italophobia is exaggerated. It is, however, real…It is 
probable that mistrust of  Italy impelled Turkey toward a closer 
relation with the United Kingdom.”16 Loraine noticed that Ital-
ian aggression might lead Turkey to search for an ally among the 
Great Powers, particularly one with a strong navy and vested in-
terests in a peaceful Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, Mussolini’s 
bellicosity—and the timidity of  the Balkan Pact given the omis-
sion of  Albania—opened the door for a strategic Anglo-Turkish 
rapprochement. Consequently, the Ambassador moved quickly 
to present Britain as a viable partner to the Turkish Republic.
 No event is more telling of  Turkey’s drift toward rap-
prochement with Britain than Ambassador Loraine’s wild eve-
ning on June 17, 1934—a night he recounted to Secretary Simon 
in a long dispatch a few days later.17 After a banquet at the Ankara 
Palace Hotel, the Ambassador was playing bridge with his usual 
fastidiousness when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of  
Turkey, and two Persian generals (both of  whom Loraine knew 
well from his mission in Tehran) entered the room and invited 
the Ambassador to join their game of  poker. Loraine accepted 
the offer and was inundated with a game of  cards that crept on 
and on throughout the night, well past the morning light. He 
later remarked, “During these long hours The Gazi quite obvi-
ously cast down all barriers of  formality, and, without any loss 
of  dignity, treated me as though I were a personal friend and 
comrade.”18 Atatürk was an adept gambler, but chose to mix up 
the chips at the end of  the game so as to resolve any diplomatic 
differences. As the party left the table, Atatürk motioned for Lo-
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raine to stay behind.
 The President thoughtfully engaged the Ambassador 
over the night’s proceedings. Atatürk wished to know if  Loraine 
imagined the President’s antics as “fortuitous” or “deliberate” 
and the Ambassador responded politely, “His Excellency did 
not give me the impression of  a man who left many things to 
chance.” Atatürk smiled and acknowledged the “excellent im-
pression” the British Ambassador already made on the Turkish 
Government, as he saw Loraine’s appointment as a “measure of  
the friendly intentions of  His Majesty’s Government.” Loraine 
later pondered, “The Gazi said he had the greatest esteem for 
England and that he wished for friendship with England. Why 
could we not come closer together?” The Ambassador further 
mused, “It was not merely a question of  the Turkey of  today, 
but also of  the Turkey of  tomorrow…[and thus there was] no 
reason why England and Turkey should not be good friends.” 
However, Loraine realized that the sticking point between closer 
relations with Turkey was the country’s “most intimate friend…
Russia.” Aware of  this apprehensive sentiment maintained by 
Loraine, President Atatürk verbally reassured the British Ambas-
sador, indicating that “Turco-Russian intimacy” was no bar to 
Anglo-Turkish friendship. In response, the Ambassador replied, 
“If  the two friendships could coexist on open and parallel lines, 
then so much the better.” President Atatürk, visibly warmed by 
this exchange, reemphasized his wish for closer relations be-
tween Turkey and Britain. Moreover, before the two men parted 
ways, Atatürk added “that if  England really desired this on her 
part, he would want us to make some unmistakable sign to that 
effect.” Evidently, Atatürk’s sentiments were genuine, since the 
following evening Loraine was invited once again to The Gazi’s 
poker table, this time sitting with the Shah of  Persia and the 
Prime Minister of  Turkey Ismet Inönü. When the Ambassador 
and the President were the last two on the draw, Atatürk leaned 
over and exclaimed, “You see what our strength is when we are 
playing against each other! Imagine what it would be if  we were 
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united!”19
 Eventually, these nightlong marathons became part of  
the living legend of  Ambassador Loraine’s skillful tête-à-tête di-
plomacy on behalf  of  the British Crown, but the mystique tied 
to these accounts does not diminish the real diplomatic efforts 
to which they were inexorably tied. According to Ambassador 
Loraine’s biographer, historian Gordon Waterfield, “Each eve-
ning one of  the hotel clerks would send a list of  those present 
in the supper-room across to the President’s house at Cankaya, 
and he would then make his way to the Hotel if  there was anyone 
he wanted to see.”20 One of  President Atatürk’s modern biogra-
phers, historian Andrew Mango, observed:
The Gazi was the fount of  new ideas and the arbiter of  
disputes: careers were made and unmade round his table. 
In one of  his many stories about his parties, he ask[ed] 
one of  his guests, ‘Tell me what goes best with raki?’ 
‘Roasted chick peas (leblebi),’ the guest replie[d], know-
ing the host’s frugal tastes. ‘Wrong,’ [responded] Mustafa 
Kemal, ‘the best accompaniment to raki is good conver-
sation.’21
Such events offered Loraine an intimate platform to access the 
President’s personal perspectives on the trajectory of  Turkish 
foreign policy. However, Atatürk represented only one side of  
the Anglo-Turkish dialogue. Ambassador Loraine always acted 
upon what he as a professional diplomat considered to be Brit-
ain’s best interests, but the Ambassador was also tied to the policy 
directives of  His Majesty’s Government, and, more specifically, 
to the designs of  the Secretary of  State in London. Tensions 
often arose between London and the British Embassy in Ankara 
regarding what form the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish rapproche-
ment should take. One such endeavor was to bring British eco-
nomic policy up to speed in an attempt to overtake the privileged 
(but waning) economic relationship harbored by the Soviets in 
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the Turkish Republic in the early 1930s.
THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY
 While Loraine was still posted in Cairo as British High 
Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan between 1929 and 1933, 
the Soviet Union orchestrated three high-level state visits with 
Turkey that represented the zenith of  Turco-Soviet cooperation 
in the interwar period.22 Historian Samuel Hirst posits that the ties 
between the two Black Sea neighbors encompassed much more 
than just strong bilateral economic relations: the exchange of  en-
gineers, machinery, and long-term economic plans was matched 
by parallel commitments to secularization and the development 
of  cultural ties, including musical and “cinematographic collabo-
ration.”23 Alternatively, some historians frame the Turco-Soviet 
understanding in terms of  self-styled anti-Westernism grounded 
in the two regional powers’ geo-historical relegation to the Eu-
ropean periphery.24 Nevertheless, the most recognizable feature 
of  this relationship was Soviet economic assistance to the bur-
geoning Turkish Republic. For example, in 1932, the Soviets sold 
eight million dollars in industrial equipment to Turkey with a 
twenty-year interest-free repayment schedule.25 By the time Am-
bassador Loraine arrived to Turkey, the Turco-Soviet relation-
ship had produced a Turco-Soviet Commercial Treaty in 1931, 
bankrolled the first Turkish Five-Year Development Plan that 
was implemented in April 1934, and provided funds to construct 
textile mills at Kaygeri and Eregli in central Anatolia. Atatürk’s 
new policy of  state-led economic growth (etatism) prospered 
with the support of  the Soviet economy, which was one of  the 
few developing economies not to suffer deleterious shocks from 
the World Economic Crisis in 1929-1930 (though the Soviet’s 
socialist economy was well-beleaguered by 1934). However, the 
Turkish economy was heavily lopsided, with the bulk of  produc-
tion remaining tied to agriculture. The industrial plan, revolving 
around state-run holding companies such as Etibank (mining) 
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and Sumerbank (manufacturing), only mobilized about 15% of  
Turkish gross national product throughout the 1930s.26
 Soviet economic support was waning by the end of  1934, 
just as major geopolitical events turned Turkish eyes from the 
Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the same forces 
that lured Turkey away from the Soviet Union pushed the coun-
try toward Britain. As Hirst notes, an internal report from the 
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated May 28, 1935, 
definitively cited that “divergent interpretations of  international 
politics threatened the [Turco-Soviet] partnership.”27 While the 
Soviet Union assumed that Nazi Germany was the principal 
threat to Europe, Turkey was more perturbed by its geopolitical 
rival in the Mediterranean Basin: Fascist Italy.
 However, while the geopolitics of  Europe were pushing 
the Turks toward the British, the etatist policies of  Turkish Minis-
ter of  Economics Celal Bayar frustrated British economists and 
precluded any further agreements from being secured. By mid-
1934, Ambassador Loraine was immersed in telegrams to and 
from Colonel Harold Woods in the Department of  Overseas 
Trade. British merchants were still operating under the Anglo-
Turkish Treaty of  Commerce and Navigation (1930), but Turkey 
began reneging on the agreement’s “most-favored nation” clause 
to set quotas and to hike up tariffs on British imports. The impe-
tus for these actions was Turkey’s negative balance of  payments 
with Britain. The Turkish government turned to a method of  
economic manipulation to arrange clearing and compensation 
agreements from its trading partners to create an “abnormal de-
mand from clearing countries for Turkish produce in order to 
free their frozen credits.”28 Because the British refused to acqui-
esce to Turkish pressures, British merchants were excluded from 
Turkish government contracts. “The outlook for the future is 
not encouraging,” wrote Loraine in the British Embassy’s An-
nual Report on Turkey for 1934.29 Therefore, one of  Loraine’s 
principal duties was to find a way to liberalize trade with the 
Turks without having to sign a humiliating clearing agreement.30
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 In March 1934, Ambassador Loraine invoked the pos-
sibility of  manipulating the British Mandate of  Palestine for ad-
ditional leverage on the Turkish economy: “The present posi-
tion is that Palestine is buying £1,000,000 worth of  stuff  from 
Turkey and is selling here about £40,000 worth”—amounting a 
significant trade imbalance that, if  ameliorated, could right the 
scales of  Turkish commercial policy to make way for more Brit-
ish exports.31 Loraine qualified his strategy to the Board of  Trade 
in London, warning, “We had better be cautious about waving 
big sticks at the Turks,” and suggesting, “We had better keep the 
possible Palestine card up [our] sleeve.”32
 Only a few months into his diplomatic tenure in Turkey, 
Loraine was already digesting Turkish public opinion and deflat-
ing the tensions that struck discord between Ankara and Lon-
don. “They are not being malicious about it but are overwhelm-
ingly impressed with the necessity of  protecting their interests,” 
the Ambassador wrote.33 Eventually, between Loraine’s diplo-
matic efforts and the work of  Colonel Woods in London, Britain 
signed a Trade and Payments Agreement with Turkey over a year 
later in June 1935, though the eventual agreement (replete with 
tariff  concessions) was constructed heavily in Turkey’s favor and 
was largely regarded as a “sacrifice” made by Britain to win favor 
in the Turkish Republic for increased diplomatic cooperation.34 
Clearly, further economic engagement proved to be the antici-
pated “sign of  support” President Atatürk had beseeched from 
the Ambassador over their game of  cards in June 1934; a year 
afterward, Loraine finally delivered the goods.
 Loraine’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934 offers 
an overview of  British perspectives on Turkish foreign policy 
substantiating the sliver of  opportunity for Anglo-Turkish rap-
prochement. Ambassador Loraine remarked specifically on Tur-
key’s “decided coolness toward Italy,” “longstanding and tried 
friendship with Russia,” “mutual commercial advantage” with 
Nazi Germany, and unmistakable “increase in friendliness” with 
Britain.35 Nonetheless, Turkish relations with His Majesty’s Gov-
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ernment remained stricken by both countries’ frustrating com-
mercial policies; the “unfortunate” shooting incident of  a British 
naval offer; and the looming nationalization of  the Anglo-French 
Constantinople Quay Company that plagued economic relations 
throughout much of  the 1930s. Part of  the debate regarding the 
Constantinople Quay Company was a fissure between the Bank 
of  England and the British Treasury. According to Turkish his-
torian Mika Suonpää, “The Bank [of  England] unsuccessfully 
opposed all commercial agreements with Turkey, and its officials 
used the problems created by the Quays Company’s nationaliza-
tion, Turkish economic policy more widely, and the country’s 
dismal debt history to argue that Britain should not pursue closer 
financial ties with Turkey.”36
 Nonetheless, politicians in London remained interested 
in building closer political ties with Turkey, therefore gener-
ally ignoring the concerns expressed by the Bank of  England. 
His Majesty’s Government used political loans (i.e. commercial 
agreements and export credits) as “part of  the strategy securing 
Turkey’s collaboration in maintaining the military and political 
stability in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and beyond.”37 
Britain was still far removed from this reality by the end of  1934, 
but Ambassador Loraine was committed to seeing this relation-
ship develop further. He watched a fresh snowfall blanket An-
kara on New Year’s Day of  1935. A little over a week later, Lo-
raine was bound for Istanbul on a warmed train, crossing the 
Anatolian highlands in pursuit of  the latest news from London.
SEARCHING FOR A MEDITERRANEAN RESPONSE
 Turkey’s diplomatic service was alert to the growing real-
ity of  Italian militarism. Turkish historian Dilek Barlas provides 
the translation of  a Turkish Foreign Ministry document from 
October 1934, which warned of  impending Italian military ac-
tion in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) “as soon as favorable domestic and 
international conditions emerged.”38 Loraine was more skepti-
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cal of  Mussolini’s territorial ambitions in Africa, contending, 
“The Turks habitually exaggerated this danger.”39 Still, in spite 
of  Ambassador Loraine’s protestations, the death of  five Ital-
ian askaris (colonial soldiers) in the contested Walwal region in 
eastern Abyssinia prompted retaliation from Rome on February 
10, 1935. Mussolini mobilized two Italian divisions and ordered 
an increased military build-up in the surrounding Italian colonies 
of  Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—a blatant threat to the sover-
eignty of  Abyssinia and the maintenance of  the status quo in the 
region.
 It was in 1935 that Anglo-Turkish relations began to pick 
up steam in response to the changing geopolitical landscape in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing importance of  
the League of  Nations in stymieing Italian aggression. At the 
same time, Ambassador Loraine’s foresight was muddled by the 
dual track diplomacy unfolding in Geneva and Ankara. Foreign 
Minister Dr. Aras was in Geneva negotiating sanctions to be 
imposed on the Italians over the crisis in Abyssinia, arbitrating 
alongside Sir Samuel Hoare and Anthony Eden, both of  whom 
served as Britain’s Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs in late 
1935. Ambassador Loraine complained to London in Decem-
ber about this divergence: “Would it be possible to improve 
and speed up the machinery for keeping British representatives 
abroad informed of  what passes at Geneva[?]…What concerns 
me is the time lag.”40 The British Ambassador was acting in a 
precarious, time-sensitive environment. The most recent infor-
mation from the League of  Nations was critical to maintaining 
the British position in Ankara. Though the Turks wished for an 
inclusive Mediterranean security arrangement with the British 
Navy as its keystone, President Atatürk was also using Italian 
aggression to call for the remilitarization of  the Turkish Straits—
this time with increased tact due to the direct threat of  Italian re-
fortification of  the Dodecanese Islands off  the coast of  western 
Anatolia. His Majesty’s Government adamantly opposed Turkish 
remilitarization of  the Straits—still dictated by the disarmament 
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clauses within the Treaties of  Lausanne (1923) and of  Locarno 
(1925)— thus placing the British in an uncomfortable position: 
Britain was interested in tightening relations with the Turks, but 
preferred not to yield to Atatürk’s primary request.41 Loraine was 
caught between these two forces, charged with spanning the gap 
that fluctuated between official and unofficial opinion in London 
and Ankara.
 On November 25, 1935, Ambassador Loraine spoke with 
the Turkish Foreign Minister about the possibilities of  Anglo-
Turkish rapprochement, and sent an evaluation of  the responses 
of  Dr. Aras to Secretary Hoare in London:
Turkey’s interests in the Mediterranean are as identical as 
they could possibly be with those of  the United King-
dom; that any diminution of  British naval influence in 
the Mediterranean would be a calamity for Turkey; that 
any Mediterranean settlement which did not take Turkish 
interests into account would be viewed by Turkey with 
alarm and dismay; that Turkey looks to the United King-
dom as the only possibly effective champion of  peace 
and security in the Mediterranean, and hencethereforth 
[sic] of  Turkish national security interests in those waters; 
that the most disastrous result for Turkey would be the 
conversion of  the Mediterranean into a Latin lake; that 
Turkey in this matter, in view of  the convincing proofs 
she has given of  her entirely pacific and peace-making 
policies, is justified in looking to the United Kingdom to 
safeguard her interests in the Mediterranean, convinced 
that the United Kingdom in doing so will be serving her 
own wider interests no less well than those of  Turkey, 
however minor her interests may appear by comparison 
with ours.42
Dr. Aras made it clear to Loraine that Turkish opinion strongly 
favored an immediate resolution of  the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, 
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followed by a Mediterranean security pact. However, as Turkish 
historian Dilek Barlas notes, “Britain alone could not restrain the 
ever-growing Italian power and threat to the region.”43 Instead, 
Turkey called for an inclusive five-power pact, which included 
France, Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, to provide for the sta-
bility of  the entire Mediterranean. This proposition was thwart-
ed quickly by disagreements among all of  the powers involved. 
In particular, France and Britain were “reluctant to assume such 
roles in the Mediterranean” once news of  Nazi Germany’s rear-
mament spread across Western Europe in 1935. Still, the Turks 
remained convinced that pulling Italy into a wide coalition would 
prove more effective than simply balancing Italian aggression 
vis-à-vis an alliance with another great power—namely Britain.44 
Turkey was not yet willing to abandon the hope of  a multilat-
eral agreement, and Britain was not yet willing to give Ankara 
the assurances that some, including Loraine, thought the Turks 
deserved. This was the geostrategic impasse on which questions 
of  the Turkish Straits became more divisive in 1936. For the 
time being, as Ambassador Loraine noted in his Annual Report 
on Turkey for 1935, “In view of  the increasing gravity of  the 
dispute between Italy and the League of  Nations, and of  the 
ensuing friendly collaboration of  His Majesty’s Government and 
Turkey, the Turkish Government, without abandoning their pur-
pose, were content to let the question of  the Straits sleep until a 
more propitious day should dawn.”45
 Italian mobilization in Abyssinia and the construction of  
airfields on the Dodecanese Islands motivated the Turks to re-
evaluate their own navy and air force in 1935. In April, Dr. Aras 
stressed Turkey’s drastic need for an updated surface navy: “It 
[is] the fleet…which in the last resort decide[s] wars…on sea a 
fleet [has] the last word.”46 While the British were enthusiastic 
toward a naval counterweight to Italy in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, they also had an international reputation to uphold as the 
“champions of  world wide disarmament.”47 Therefore, Britain 
was forced to tread a thin and hypocritical line governing Tur-
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key’s rearmament that would not go so far as to invoke questions 
of  remilitarizing the Straits. Barlas and fellow Turkish historian 
Serhat Güvenç draw attention to a British Foreign Office docu-
ment from November 1934 that expressed concern that “The 
prospect of  a race between Italy and her nervous little neighbors 
conducted on borrowed money [would be] a nightmare.”48
 Turkey, looking to buy naval armaments from the lowest 
bidder, signed a contract with Nazi Germany to buy four sub-
marines between 1936 and 1937.49 Britain was already alarmed by 
Nazi Germany’s large economic foothold in Turkey, and politi-
cians in London moved swiftly to keep Turkey out of  Hitler’s 
orbit, a strategy that was billed as a geostrategic check to Nazi 
German encroachment in the vulnerable Balkan Peninsula.50 To 
prevent Nazi Germany’s strong economic ties with Turkey from 
turning into direct political influence, the British Admiralty in-
creased its sensitivities for the Turkish Navy, exchanging fleet 
inspections and synchronizing naval cooperation over the ensu-
ing years. 
 The British Government’s attempts to bolster the Turkish 
Air Force were also impeded by strained economic relations. By 
mistake, the Turkish General Staff  learned that Britain recently 
had sold a number of  warplanes to Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the 
Turks wished to issue an order for themselves. However, when 
the Turkish General Staff  requested to buy one million pounds 
in British aircraft, commercial negotiations once again under-
mined the transaction and both parties were forced to settle for a 
reduced number of  aircraft that satisfied the conservative agenda 
of  the bankers in London.51 Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 
1935 was thus still held back by the lethargy of  British com-
mercial policy. Britain was not interested in increasing trade with 
Turkey—British firms could buy cheaper raw materials from 
British colonies abroad—and London’s policy of  maintaining a 
favorable balance of  trade was rejected outright by the Turkish 
government. Thus, even in terms of  geopolitical security, Britain 
“could not put the rapprochement between the two countries 
102     Otto Kienitz
The Emerging Storm
onto sound economic foundations,” a fact that shouldered even 
more responsibility onto Ambassador Loraine.52
 What Loraine did manage to accomplish in 1935 was the 
realization of  an informal multilateral Mediterranean security 
pact that worked both in and around the League of  Nations. 
The alliance grouped Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia to-
gether in a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that imposed sanctions on 
Italy via the League of  Nations’ Committee of  Eighteen, guar-
anteeing each other mutual support in the case of  further Ital-
ian aggression.53 The Italian Ambassador to Turkey was alarmed 
by Turkey’s blatant alignment with Britain and outwardly criti-
cized this reactionary measure. The Turkish Foreign Ministry 
responded by making clear that Turkey was simply obliging its 
commitments to the League of  Nations, “which were no secret 
at all.”54 Fortuitously, the French acquiesced to the British-led se-
curity agreement in the Mediterranean, and with the conclusion 
of  the Franco-Soviet Pact, in addition to the extension of  the 
Turco-Soviet Protocol in 1935, Turkey’s strategic defense was 
secured within a constellation of  advantageous relationships. 
Admittedly, the weakness within this multilateral “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement” was the attitude of  France and Britain toward Italy. 
The Great Powers still hoped to divert a potential conflict by 
appeasing Mussolini and deflating Italian revisionism through 
diplomatic engagement. The tension between an explicit Medi-
terranean Pact that targeted Italy (the Turkish position) and an 
implicit understanding that would include Italy in maintaining 
the status quo (the British position) was a crucial consideration 
in the development of  Anglo-Turkish relations.
 Therefore, by the end of  1935, Britain was facing a stra-
tegic impasse highlighted by the divergent directives coming out 
of  London. The Foreign Office reflected the gloomy views of  
Secretary Eden and his advisors, mainly “that [Mussolini] would 
be compelled to launch fresh adventures and end [up] as Hit-
ler’s satellite.55 These attitudes were doubly opposed by Britain’s 
conservative press and military, which held that Mussolini would 
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“soon revert to his former role of  ‘good European.’”56 There-
fore, while the Foreign Office continued to pursue an alliance 
bloc—advocating defensive agreements with Greece and Tur-
key—the joint command of  the British military was reluctant 
to acknowledge any action that might alienate Rome. Admiral 
Ernle Chatfield argued that Britain’s support of  sanctions from 
the League of  Nations and London’s trust in collective security 
“have got us into this quarrel with Italy,” putting undue stress 
on Britain’s imperial responsibilities, which was an “intolerable 
strain on the navy’s resources and [an] unacceptable risk of  
war.”57 Historian Reynolds Salerno provides that “Britain’s lack 
of  adequate naval bases and weak military strength in the eastern 
Mediterranean would require the British to be on the defensive 
if  Italy became hostile, regardless of  the number of  British allies 
there.”58
 Britain’s tender relations with Italy were compounded by 
Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (left), His Majesty 
King Edward VIII of  the United Kingdom (center), and 
British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) meet aboard 
Atatürk’s personal yacht in Istanbul, Turkey, 
on September 5, 1936.
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two maxims of  strategic thinking. First, His Majesty’s Govern-
ment took for granted that a hostile Italy made a general Euro-
pean war more likely and dangerous. Second, British imperial de-
fense doctrine specified three major geostrategic commitments: 
“the defense of  the Far East, the defense of  India, and obliga-
tions in Western Europe arising from the Locarno Pact.”59 An 
aggressive Italy subverted Britain’s strategic unity. By extending 
influence into the Eastern Mediterranean as far as the Dodeca-
nese Islands, Italy could simultaneously threaten the Suez Canal 
in Egypt; jeopardize British land and air routes to the Indian 
Raj (through Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq); destabilize the Balkan 
Peninsula by supporting Bulgarian revanchism and Nazi Ger-
man designs on Southeastern Europe; and—in the event of  
Japanese pugnacity in the Far East—unbalance the distribution 
of  the British naval fleet by prompting a “stab in the back from 
Mussolini” if  Britain deployed its forces elsewhere.60 First Lord 
of  the Admiralty Winston Churchill was one of  the few British 
statesmen to understand the threats posed in Southeastern Eu-
rope. He maintained that Britain and France must bring Turkey 
into the war to support Romania in the Balkan Peninsula, gain 
control of  the Black Sea, and seal the Mediterranean Basin to 
prevent the Nazis from “solv[ing] their problems of  food and oil 
supply and thus to defeat the Allies’ long-war strategy.”61
 While Winston Churchill articulated this opinion in 1939 
in the face of  war, the strategic calculus of  the British navy in 
the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced back to the origins of  
Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1934-1935. Keeping this ap-
proach in mind, it is no coincidence that Permanent Under-Sec-
retary of  State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan would 
identify Turkey as the “lynch-pin” of  the entire Eastern Mediter-
ranean.62 With Fascist Italy orchestrating espionage campaigns in 
Morocco and Malta, riling Macedonian and Croat nationalism in 
Yugoslavia, subsidizing and producing anti-British propaganda 
in Egypt and Palestine, amassing a sizable military force in Libya, 
and claiming Mussolini as the “Protector of  Islam” in the Middle 
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East, a pro-British Turkish Republic was vital to stymie the score 
of  Italian hostilities across the Mediterranean Basin.63 Neverthe-
less, as the calendar turned from 1935 to 1936, Ambassador Lo-
raine was still struggling with the Foreign Office to see eye-to-
eye with the Turks in Ankara, particularly over the disagreements 
at the League of  Nations in Geneva concerning the status of  the 
Turkish Straits in the face of  the burgeoning threat to peace on 
the European continent.
IMPLICATIONS OF ANGLO-TURKISH
RAPPROCHEMENT
  At a dinner party in the summer of  1937, Loraine im-
parted to his guests: “The duty of  the diplomat is not so much 
to avert war at any price, as to ensure that, if  war is inevitable, his 
country will at least have the right allies. It takes many years of  
persevering peace-time effort to accomplish as much.”64 Keep-
ing the Ambassador’s judicious words in mind, the study of  dip-
lomatic history during peacetime can be just as illuminating as 
the study of  diplomatic discontinuities during times of  war. The 
story of  Anglo-Turkish rapprochement contains both. While 
Turkey tried to entrench Anglo-Turkish relations in an explicit 
multilateral Mediterranean Pact multiple times between 1934 
and 1939, Britain hoped that an implicit understanding of  their 
advantageous relationship would give British (and Turkish) poli-
cymakers more flexibility to pursue divergent diplomatic goals 
while fostering stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Brit-
ish thus delayed the signing of  any substantial written agreement 
with Turkey, preferring to appease the Italians and the Nazis in-
stead. The British strategy of  appeasement in the Mediterranean 
Basin finally fell apart in the face of  Italy’s invasion of  Albania in 
April 1939. Therefore, by the time of  the signing of  the Anglo-
French-Turkish Treaty of  Mutual Assistance in October 1939, 
the European state system had already begun to unravel past the 
point of  no return. The explicit multilateral security pact Turkey 
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sought out in 1935 was useless by 1939, and the Turkish Re-
public had no other choice but to declare neutrality during the 
Second World War (1939-1945).
 Before 1939, an alliance with Turkey provided Britain a 
key agent in Southeastern Europe, theoretically making it pos-
sible to deter and protect the Balkan Peninsula from Italian and 
Nazi German aggression. Some scholars have admonished Brit-
ain and the other Western Allied Powers—including France and 
the United States of  America—for the ‘abandonment’ and ‘be-
trayal’ of  Southern and Eastern Europe, not at the Yalta Confer-
ence in February 1945, but earlier at the Munich Conference in 
September 1938, shaming the Allied Powers for turning away 
from the small nations of  Europe.65 However, such an assess-
ment is more complicated if  one evaluates the Anglo-Turkish 
Mutual Aid Agreement of  May 12, 1938 as a defensive corol-
lary for the region that established an Anglo-Turkish bulwark in 
the Balkan Peninsula months before the Munich Agreement was 
signed on September 30, 1938. Given the enthusiastic rhetoric 
of  Anglo-Turkish rapprochement on both sides, and London’s 
surprise at Ankara’s decision to shrink before its treaty duties in 
1939, it can be argued that Britain invested real strategic value in 
Turkey as a guarantor of  Allied security in the Balkan Peninsula, 
both before and after the Munich Conference.
 Without completely turning toward counterfactual his-
tory, the fate of  Southeastern Europe may not have been sealed 
at the Munich Conference in September 1938, but, in actuality, 
signed away in Moscow with the German-Soviet (Molotov-Rib-
bentrop) Non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. The Soviet 
‘betrayal’ of  the Allied Powers did not just erase Poland from the 
map: the agreement effectively compromised Turkey’s eastern 
flank and undermined the country’s ability to act freely in align-
ment with Britain and France. When the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact was exposed, Britain’s most important ally in the region—
the Turkish Republic—was geopolitically compromised and sub-
sequently pressured to bow out of  the Anglo-French-Turkish 
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Treaty of  1939 and retire into neutrality in 1940. Returning to 
the details of  Loraine’s game of  cards on June 17, 1934, the span 
of  Anglo-Turkish relations was augured by President Atatürk’s 
assessment that Turkey would maintain “open and parallel… 
friendships” with Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain’s bet on 
the Turkish Republic in 1934 was spoiled by the Soviets’ gamble 
on Nazi Germany in 1939.
 Therefore, Turkey’s role in Britain’s grand strategy should 
not be discounted, especially in terms of  the decision for further 
appeasement at the Munich Conference of  1938. The wishful 
thinking driving Anglo-Turkish rapprochement permeated the 
Allied Powers’ grand strategy, and the mythos of  the ‘abandon-
ment’ and ‘betrayal’ of  the small nations of  Europe should be 
measured against Britain’s reliance on Turkey’s cooperation and 
influence (including the Turkish Republic’s shared “views, inter-
ests, and principles”) in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean between the inception of  Anglo-Turkish rap-
His Majesty King Edward VIII of  the United Kingdom 
(center left) alongside Turkish President Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk (center right) in Istanbul in 1936. Their first meet-
ing was orchestrated by British Ambassador Sir Percy 
Loraine, indicating the success of  Anglo-Turkish 
rapprochement.
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prochement in 1934 and its subsequent collapse in 1939-1940.66 
Later, Loraine reflected on the legacy of  his diplomatic mission 
in Turkey:
[If  the observer needed] any proof…of  the efficacy of  
the British lines of  policy…shall we not find it in the fact 
that the Turkish Republic, many of  whose men fought 
against us in the last war, is now our friend and ally and 
has kept, at enormous sacrifice to the nation, an army 
of  one million men mobilized for three years to oppose 
any aggression on her sovereignty, her territory and her 
liberty.67
 In hindsight, Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was a dip-
lomatic achievement. Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine succeeded 
in turning a historical enemy into a benevolent bystander, due in 
part to what esteemed British diplomat Sir Pierson Dixon called, 
“the excellence of  [Ambassador Loraine’s] judgment—[which] 
might better be called the rarest of  all qualities: wisdom.”68 As 
one of  Loraine’s dinner guests in the summer of  1937 exclaimed, 
“If  the pendulum [of  Turkish policy] was now swinging over 
to friendship with Great Britain, it was because the unremitting 
efforts of  the Ambassador had set it in motion.”69 Nonetheless, 
the momentum of  Loraine’s lauded tenure in the Turkish capital 
could not keep Turkey from folding in the face of  war; for along-
side Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, like in any game of  poker or 
diplomacy, there were always other hands in play.
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